Chord is a distributed hash table (DHT) that requires only O(log n) links per node and performs searches with latency and message cost O(log n), where n is the number of peers in the network. Chord assumes all nodes behave according to protocol. We give a variant of Chord which, for any fixed 0 > 0, is resilient to (1/4 − 0 )z Byzantine nodes joining the network over a time period during which 1) there are always at least z total nodes in the network and 2) the number of correct peers joining and leaving is no more than z k for some tunable parameter k. We assume there is an omniscient and computationally unbounded adversary controlling the Byzantine peers and that the IP-addresses of all the Byzantine peers and the locations where they join the network are carefully selected by this adversary.
Introduction
A distributed hash table (DHT) is a structured peer-to-peer network which provides for scalable and distributed storage and lookup of data items (see e.g. [22, 19, 25] ). Because peer-to-peer networks have little to no admission control, there has been significant effort in designing DHT's which are robust to Byzantine faults. When a peer suffers a Byzantine fault it is assumed to be controlled by an omniscient adversary who uses that peer to try to disrupt the network. The standard attack model considered is as follows. There is an instantaneous attack during which each peer in the network suffers a Byzantine fault independently at random with constant probability (less than 1/2). We will refer to this type of attack as a random Byzantine attack. Several DHT's have been designed which provide robust storage and lookup of data items, even in the face of a random Byzantine attack [7, 17, 10] .
While this past work is encouraging, the random Byzantine attack model is unsatisfying. In particular, it seems that a much more likely attack scenario is that an adversary
Our Contributions
In this paper, we describe a variant of Chord, S-Chord, which is robust to the Byzantine join attack. Define a z-good interval to be a time interval during which: 1) the number of total peers in the network is always at least z; 2) the number of Byzantine peers joining the network is no more than (1/4 − 0 )z for some 0 > 0; and 3) the number of correct peers joining and leaving during this time interval is no more than z k for some tunable parameter k. Theorem 1 states the main result of this paper. Theorem 1. During any z-good interval, the following properties hold for S-Chord with high probability (specifically with probability of error polynomially small in z)
• All functionality of Chord is preserved.
• We can enforce a rule-set for all peers in the network.
• For n peers in the network, the resource costs are as follows:
-O(log n) latency and expected O(log 2 n) messages sent per lookup operation.
-Θ(log n) latency and Θ(log 3 n) messages sent per peer join operation.
-O(log 2 n) links stored at each peer.
In addition to being robust to the Byzantine join attack, S-Chord is also robust to the random Byzantine attack. Aside from robustness to this new, more realistic attack model, the other new contributions of S-Chord are as follows.
• S-Chord can enforce a set of rules describing "proper behavior" such as: "For every 20 search that a peer issues, that peer must service one search request". In particular, the consequences of not obeying the rules will be disconnection from the network. To the best of our knowledge, S-Chord is the first p2p network with this property.
• S-Chord is based on Chord and thus inherits many of Chord's good properties. Moreover, we feel that the general techniques used in this paper can be applied to a wide-range of other DHT's.
• S-Chord requires Θ(log 2 ) messages for lookups in expectation. Previous DHT's which are robust to the random Byzantine attack require Θ(log 3 n) messages. Under the additional assumption of a computationally bounded adversary, we also show how we can ensure only an expected constant factor increase in the number of bits sent when sending large messages through the network.
Related Work
Recent years have witnessed the advent of large scale real-world peer-to-peer applications such as Gnutella, Napster, Kazaa, Morpheus, BitTorrent, and many others. Several distributed hash tables (DHTs) have been introduced which are provably robust to random peer deletions (i.e. fail-stop faults) [19, 25, 20, 22, 12, 1, 9] .
We are aware of only three results which deal with the more challenging problem of designing DHTs which are robust to Byzantine faults. All three of these results are robust only to the random Byzantine attack described earlier. Fiat and Saia describe a DHT which uses expander graphs and a butterfly network to achieve robustness to this attack [7] . Unfortunately, this DHT is not fully dynamic in the sense that it does not easily allow for significant changes in network size. Naor and Wieder describe a much simpler DHT which is robust to the random Byzantine attack and is also fully dynamic [17] . Hildrum and Kubiatowicz describe how to modify two popular DHTs, Pastry [20] and Tapestry [25] , in order to make them robust to the random Byzantine attack [10] . Their modified DHTs are fully dynamic. 2 In all three of these results, lookups have Θ(log n) latency and require Θ(log 3 n) messages. In this paper, we make use of ideas from all three of these results.
Our DHT makes use of secure multiparty computation in order to choose random IDs for joining peers by consensus. There is a significant body of work in the area of secure multiparty computation (see e.g. [23, 8, 3, 5, 2, 4, 21, 18, 11] ). Section 4 and Appendix C describe in detail how we use these results.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a high level overview of S-Chord. Section 3 describes with the protocol SU CCESSOR which allows peers in S-Chord to publish and lookup content. Section 4 describes the protocol JOIN which is used to allow new peers to join the network. Section 5 provides an algorithm that reduces the message complexity of SU CCESSOR from O(log 3 n) worst case to O(log 2 n) in expectation. Section 6 gives an algorithm that allows SU CCESSOR to incur only an expected constant factor increase in the number of bits sent over what is required for Chord. This result assumes a computationally bounded adversary. We conclude and suggest some avenues of future research in Section 7. The Appendix contains all proofs for these sections as well as other details omitted due to space constraints.
Overview 2.1 Chord
We now briefly describe Chord [22] . 3 For convenience, we will assume that the "key space" of Chord is scaled so it is in the range (0, 1] and will think of Chord as a circle with unit circumference, which we will call the unit circle. All of the peers in Chord have identifiers (or IDs for short) which are points on the unit circle that we call peer points. Chord provides one basic operation: successor(). For a point k on the unit circle, successor(k) returns the peer, p, whose peer point minimizes the clockwise distance between k and p. Typically, k represents a key for some data item and successor(k) is the peer responsible for storing that data item. Thus, the successor() operation provides for easy storage and lookups of data items.
We now briefly sketch how Chord implements the operation successor(). We assume that all peers in the network know some number m which is always greater than the number of peers in the network 4 . For a point p on the unit circle and integer i between 0 and log m − 1, let f (p, i) be the point p + 2 i /m. For each i between 1 and log m − 1, each peer p maintains a link to the peer whose peer point is closest clockwise to the point f (p, i). When a peer p links to a peer p , the peer p simply stores the IP address of p . The number of unique peers that a peer p links to is O(log n). For points p and k on the unit circle, let next(p, k) be the point in the set {f (p, 0), f (p, 1), f (p, 2), . . . f (p, log m − 1)}, which has closest clockwise distance to k.
We can now describe the successor() operation. Assume that some peer p calls successor(k) for some key k on the unit circle. If next(p, k) = p, then p already knows the successor of k: it is simply the closest clockwise peer to p. The search terminates by returning this peer. If next(p, k) = p where p = p, then p forwards the search request to p . The same procedure is repeated until the search terminates.
Notation
For any two points x and y on the unit circle, let d(x, y) be the distance from x to y traveling clockwise along the perimeter of the unit circle (i.e. if y ≥ x, then d(x, y) = y−x else d(x, y) = (1 − x) + y). When referring to intervals or points on the unit circle, all addition is performed modulo 1. We will call a peer controlled by the adversary faulty and call a peer not controlled by the adversary (i.e. a peer that follows the protocol) correct.
S-Chord
In our protocol, peers do not get to choose their own ID's. Instead they are assigned, by our protocol, a random ID between 0 and 1 when they first join the network. Following convention, for a given peer p, we will frequently use p to refer both to the peer and to the ID of the peer. The precise meaning should be clear from context. Central to our protocol is the notion of a swarm. For every point x on the unit circle, we define the swarm, S(x), to be the set of peers whose ID's are located within a clockwise distance of (C ln n)/n of the point x on the unit circle (where C is a constant depending on our fault-tolerant parameters). For a given peer p, we will use S(p) to mean the swarm associated with the peer p. All communication that p has with the DHT first passes through the swarm S(p). Swarms, not peers, are the atomic functional units of our protocols. We say that a swarm is good if at least a 3/4 fraction of the peers in it are correct. Due to the fact that our protocol randomly assigns ID's to peers, we can guarantee with high probability that over a z-good time interval, all swarms will be good. Thus, we can say that even though many peers are not correct, all of the swarms will be good. This fact is the basis for the robustness of our DHT.
Overview:
We begin by assuming that all peers in the network know the values ln n and (ln n)/n exactly. Under this assumption, we present protocols for 1) obtaining content from network and sending messages (Section 3), 2) handling dynamic peer joins (Section 4) and 3) stabilization to handle peer deletions and the effects of changing network size on interval tracking (Section A.5). These protocols provide the same basic functionality of those used in Chord; however, they have been extended to work with swarms. In Appendix B, we give the required modifications to our protocols for the case where the peers do not know the values of ln n and (ln n)/n.
Links Required
In this section, we state the links that each peer is required to maintain in our protocol. We will often make statements referring to some correct peer p maintaining links to all peers in an interval [a, b] for a, b ∈ (0, 1]. Assume that this means p maintains links to all correct peers and those faulty peers of which p is aware. Every peer p maintains links to all peers in the following intervals.
• Center Interval: Center(p) is the set of peers in the interval [p − (2C ln n)/n, p + (2C ln n)/n].
• Forward Intervals: For all i between 1 and log m − 1, F orward(p, i) is the set of peers in the interval
• Backward Intervals: For all i between 1 and log m − 1, Backward(p, i) is the set of peers in the interval [p − 2 i /m − (C ln n)/n, p − 2 i /m + (C ln n)/n]. Figure 1 illustrates links maintained in Chord and our enhanced DHT. A peer p keeps track of the links in the Center interval so that 1) p knows all peers in S(p), 2) p knows all peers p such that p ∈ S(p ) and 3) p is able to help compute the SU CCESSOR algorithm described in Section 3. A peer p, keeps track of the Forward intervals so that is able to forward on requests for the SU CCESSOR function. While in Chord, requests for a successor are forwarded to a single peer, in our system, they are forwarded to an entire swarm. A peer p, keeps track of the Backward intervals so that it is able to recognize legitimate requests sent during computations of the SU CCESSOR function. In our protocol, we do not trust a peer to tell us its identifier (i.e. where it is located on the unit circle). Thus, a peer p specifically requires links to Backward intervals in order to keep track of the IDs of those peers who may legitimately send p messages. All messages sent to p from peers which are not in one of p's Backward intervals are ignored. Lemma 1. Let p and q be any two peers. Then, the following are true:
• If p ∈ Center(q) then q ∈ Center(p)
• If p ∈ F orward(q, i) for some i between 1 and log m − 1, then q ∈ Backward(p, i)
• If p ∈ Backward(q, i) for some i between 1 and log m − 1, then q ∈ F orward(p, i).
Lemma 2.
With high probability, the number of peers any peer links to is Θ(log 2 n). 
Algorithm 1 SUCCESSOR(p)
1: p sends a request for k to all peers in S(p); 2: S ← set of all peers in S(p);
x ← next(x, k);
All peers in S send the request for k to all peers in S(x );
7:
S ← set of all peers in S(x ) that received the above request from a majority of the peers in S;
8:
S ← S ;
9:
x ← x ; 10: end while 11: The peers in S send back pointers to all the peers in S(k). These pointers are sent backwards along the same path, in the same manner, to the peer p;
Sucessor Protocol
Algorithm 1 gives the pseudocode for our robust SU CCESSOR protocol which is analogous to the successor operation of Chord. Figure 2 illustrates a run of SU CCESSOR. For a point k on the unit circle, SU CCESSOR(k) returns pointers to the peers in S(k). As in Chord, k would typically represent a key for some data item. SU CCESSOR(k) returns pointers to the set of peers responsible for storing that data item. Thus, the SU CCESSOR operation provides for redundant storage and lookups of data items.
For a key k and peer p, SU CCESSOR(k) works as follows when called by p. Peer p initially sends the request for k to all peers in S(p). Let x equal the ID of p and S be S(p). Until d(x, k) ≤ (C ln n)/n, the following loop repeats: the peers in S forward the request to all peers in S(x ) where x = next(x, k). Let S be the set of peers in S(x ) which receive the request from a majority of peers in S. The loop now repeats with S set to S and x set to x . When the loop terminates, d(x, k) ≤ (C ln n)/n, so all peers in the set S have pointers to all peers in S(k). These pointers to peers in S(k) are then sent backwards along the same path, in the same manner, to the originating peer p. The following lemma is true with high probability over any z-good time interval.
Lemma 3. The following is true provided that all swarms in the DHT are good. For any key k and peer p, SU CCESSOR(k) always returns pointers to all peers in S(k) when called by peer p. Moreover, SU CCESSOR has latency O(log n) and requires O(log 3 n) messages.
For a given peer p, message m and an interval I on the unit circle, we define SEN D M ESSAGE(m, I) to be an algorithm which allows p to send message m to all peers in the interval I. If I is of length Θ((ln n)/n), it's straightforward to see how O(1) calls to a modified SU CCESSOR algorithm will create a SEN D M ESSAGE algorithm with latency O(log n) and message cost O(log 3 n) (the detailed pseudocode is omitted). When writing the JOIN protocol, we will make use of the SEN D M ESSAGE algorithm.
We now describe conditions under which we can show that all swarms are good.
Lemma 4. Assume that 1) all peer points are distributed uniformly at random on the unit circle; and 2) the fraction of faulty peers is no more than 1/4 − . Let k be any fixed integer and C be sufficiently large but depending only on k, then with probability at least 1 − 1/n k , the following statement is true. For any point x on the unit circle, the swarm S(x) is good.
We now provide a description of how S-Chord allows for the enforcement of a rule set on all peers in the system, provided that all swarms are good. The desired rule set must be known in advance by all correct peers. The rule set can be enforced by having the correct peers in a swarm act in concert to stop any prohibited behavior. For instance, if a faulty peer p attempts to abuse bandwidth resources by making excessive calls to SU CCESSOR, the correct peers in S(p) can simply refuse to participate in the SU CCESSOR calls after a certain pre-defined cut-off point.
Peer Joins
Pseudocode for the JOIN algorithm is given in Algorithm 2 and an example run of the algorithm is illustrated in Figure 3 . The JOIN algorithm makes use of an algorithm 1: Peer p contacts some correct peer q which notifies S(q) of p's request to join; 2: All peers in S(q) come to consensus on a random number in (0, 1] to be used as the ID for p, using the algorithm discussed in Appendix C; 3: All peers in S(q) notify peers in Center(p), using the SEN D M ESSAGE algorithm, that p has joined the network; 4: All peers in S(q) get pointers to the peers in Center(p), using O(1) calls to the SU CCESSOR algorithm. All peers in S(q) send these pointers to p; 5: The peers in Center(p) send data items for all keys k such that p ∈ S(k) and p then stores copies of these data items; 6: for (i = (log m − 3 log n) to log m) do
7:
All peers in S(p) use all-to-all communication with the set P of peers in [p + 2 i /m, p + 2 i /m + (C ln n)/n] telling them of p's arrival. All peers in S 1 then use all-to-all communication with the set of peers S 2 in [p+2 i /m−(C ln n)/n, p+2 i /m] telling them of p's arrival. In this way, all peers in F orward(p, i) know about p;
8:
In an almost identical fashion to Step 7, all peers in S(p) get pointers to the peers in F orward(p, i). All peers in S(p) then send these pointers to p; In an almost identical fashion to Step 9, all peers in S(p) get pointers to the peers in Backward(p, i). All peers in S(p) then send these pointers to p; 11: end for which allows a good swarm to choose a random number in the range (0,1]. The JOIN algorithm assumes that peer p knows some correct peer q. In the algorithm, p first contacts peer q with p's request to join the network. Peer q alerts S(q) to this request and the peers in S(q) first choose a random ID for p using the algorithm discussed in Section C. The peers in S(q) then introduce p to the peers of Center(p) (Center(p) includes the peers in S(p)). All peers in S(p) then find all the peers in p's Forward and Backward intervals. In addition, the peers in S(p) introduce p to all peers, p , in the network such that p is now in a Center, Forward or Backward interval for p .
Lemma 5. The JOIN protocol has the following properties with high probability:
• JOIN has Θ(log n) latency and Θ(log 3 n) message complexity.
• After JOIN completes, peer p knows all peers in its Center, Forward and Backward intervals.
• Let q be any peer with the property that p is in a Center, Forward or Backward interval for q. Then after JOIN completes, q knows about the peer p.
• Assume, before p joins the network, that the fraction of faulty peers is no more than 1/4 − and that all peer points are distributed uniformly at random on the unit circle. Then after p joins the network, all peer points are distributed uniformly at random on the unit circle.
In Section A.5, we present the ST ABILIZE protocol that allows peers to maintain current views of the network. As join operations occur, periodically running ST ABILIZE keeps a peer p's pointers to its Forward, Backward, and Center intervals up to date. In the case of concurrent joins, temporary slowdowns in SU CCESSOR operations may occur since pointers may be stale or absent. However, the periodic invocation of ST ABILIZE will correct out of date pointers and allow for the SU CCESSOR protocol to function normally.
Θ(log 2 n) Expected Messages For SUCCESSOR
In this section, we show how to improve SU CCESSOR so that it sends only Θ(log 2 n) messages in expectation. We assume that all peers have a hash function h 1 which maps peer identifiers to the positive integers. We make the random oracle assumption about h 1 i.e. for any input, all outputs are equally likely. We assume that the number of peers in any swarm is Θ(log n) and at least C log n for some fixed constant C. We also assume that all swarms have at least a 3/4 fraction of correct peers.
Algorithm 3 Message Sending Protocol
1: Each peer x ∈ S j−1 sends a message to peer y ∈ S j iff h 1 (x) = h 1 (y) mod log n 2: Each peer y ∈ S j accepts a message from peer x ∈ S j−1 iff h 1 (x) = h 1 (y) mod log n 3: Each peer y ∈ S j , upon receiving messages from at least 2/3-rds of the peers that it would accept from, does majority filtering on all the messages received to decide which message if any to propagate to the next swarm.
Our algorithm for reducing message cost when sending from swarm S j−1 to swarm S j is given in Algorithm 3. It assumes that swarm S j−1 wants to send a message to a swarm S j (For ease of exposition, for a real number r, we will write r instead of r . It should be clear from context which is meant.). This algorithm is used in steps 6 and 7 of the SUCCESSOR pseudocode given in Algorithm 1. The proof of the following Lemma is given in Appendix A.6.
Lemma 6. For C sufficiently large but depending only on k , the following is true with probability at least 1 − 1/n k :
• All calls to SUCCESSOR succeed.
• All calls to SUCCESSOR send Θ(log 2 n) messages in expectation.
Expected Constant Factor Increase in Number of Bits
In this section we assume that peer p is trying to transmit a message m along the path p, S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , . . . , S l where S i , i = 1, . . . , l are swarms. We assume that the adversary is polynomially bounded and that all swarms have at least a 3/4 fraction of correct peers. Let |m| be the number of bits in the message m. Peer p first encodes m into log n pieces e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e ln −1 with the following properties: 1) each piece has O(|m|/ log n) bits and 2) m can be reconstructed from any 1/16-th fraction of the pieces. Any standard erasure code, such as tornado codes [14] , can be used to create pieces with these two properties.
Peer p next creates fingerprints f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f log n−1 of all these pieces using a 1-way hash function, h 2 known by all the peers. For all i = 1, . . . , log n − 1, f i = h 2 (e i ). Each of the fingerprints has log 2 n bits. This ensures that the probability that a random string maps to a fixed fingerprint is 1/n log n . Thus it will take the adversary superpolynomial time to find a string which maps to one of the fingerprints.
Peer p sends all of the fingerprints to all of the peers in S 1 . Then for all j = 2, . . . , l, all peers in S j−1 send all of the fingerprints to all the peers in S j and peers in S j accept a fingerprint if and only if it was received from a majority of peers in S j−1 . This guarantees that all peers in the swarms S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S l know all of the fingerprints. We will thus assume, in the protocol, described in this section, that a peer accepts a string s as some piece e j iff h 2 (s) = f j .
Algorithm 4
Sending from S j−1 to S j 1: Each peer in S j−1 sends the fingerprints f 0 , f 1 , . . . , f ln n−1 to each peer in S j . 2: The peers accept only those fingerprints that they receive from a majority of the peers in S j−1 . In the remainder of the algorithm, a peer in S j only accepts a string s as some piece e j if h 2 (s) = f j . . 3: while TRUE do
4:
Peers in S j−1 come to consensus on a random integer r in {0, 1, . . . log n − 1} using the protocol describe in Section C.
5:
Let P = {x ∈ S j |h 1 (x) = r}. All peers in S j−1 send all of the pieces they currently hold to all peers in the set P .
6:
All peers in P reconstruct the message m from the pieces received. From the message m, they then recompute the pieces e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e log n−1 .
7:
For each i = 1, . . . , log n − 1, all peers in P send piece e i to all peers x ∈ S j such that h 1 (x) = i mod log n.
8:
The peers in S j come to consensus about whether they want a resend as follows:
Each peer x ∈ S j does the following. If h 1 (x) = i mod log n and x received piece e i , x writes all peers in S j that it received its piece.
2.
Every peer x ∈ S j does the following. If x received messages indicating that at least (3/4)|S j | peers received their pieces, it tentatively sets an individual "resend" bit to 0 otherwise it sets this bit to 1.
3.
All peers in Y do Byzantine agreement to come to consensus on the "resend" bit values set in the previous step.
9:
The peers in S j send to the peers in S j−1 the results of this consensus i.e. either that they want a resend or that they do not want a resend.
10:
If the peers in S j−1 receive responses from more than 1/4 of the peers in S j that they do not want a resend, the algorithm terminates. 11: end while The first step of our protocol is simple. Peer p sends piece e i to peer x ∈ S 1 iff h 1 (x) = i mod log n. The general protocol where S j−1 sends to S j for all j = 2, . . . , l is given as Algorithm 4 and illustrated in Figure 4 . This protocol makes use of a Byzantine agreement protocol and the protocol for coming to consensus on a random number discussed in Section C. The proof of the following Lemma is given in Appendix A.7.
Lemma 7. For any fixed k, for C sufficiently large but depending only on k, the following is true with probability 1 − 1/n k , if we run Algorithm 4 with SEN D M ESSAGE:
• All calls to SEN D M ESSAGE succeed.
• All calls to SEN D M ESSAGE have latency O(log n) in expectation.
• All calls to SEN D M ESSAGE require O(log 4 n) messages to be sent in expectation.
• All calls to SEN D M ESSAGE require O(|m| log n + log 5 n) bits to be sent in expectation. send fingerprints to all peers in S j . Peers in S j majority filter on these fingerprints. (B) All peers in S j−1 send all pieces of the message to those peers in S j belonging to the set P described in Algorithm 4 (in this figure, P consists of only one peer). (C) The peer in P reconstructs the message, recomputes the pieces, and sends these pieces to the peers in S j . (D) Peers in S j come to a consensus and communicate with S j−1 as to whether or not they wish S j−1 to resend.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced the Byzantine join attack, an attack model under which an omniscient adversary causes a large number of Byzantine peers to join a network. We assume that the adversary carefully chooses the IP-addresses of these peers and where they join the network in order to try to place them at critical locations. We have described, S-Chord, a variant of Chord that is provably robust to the Byzantine join attack. S-Chord also allows us to enforce a rule set on the peers in the network and thereby prevent undesirable behavior. In comparison to Chord's successor, this robustness is gained at the cost of an expected log n factor increase in the number of messages per SU CCESSOR operation and a log n factor increase in the number of links stored per peer. We have also shown that if we make the additional assumption of a computationally bounded adversary and message sizes are large, SU CCESSOR can be implemented with only an expected constant factor increase in the number of bits sent over what is required by Chord.
There are several problems that deserve future attention. First, can some of the techniques of this paper be adapted to be used in a practical peer-to-peer system? Second, it seems likely that Ω(log 2 n) is a lower bound on the message complexity in the Byzantine model; however, can we prove this? Finally, can the methods we have presented also be applied to make other DHTs, such as CAN and Tapestry, resilient to Byzantine join attack? 
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Main Theorem Theorem 1. During any z-good interval, with high probability (specifically with failure probability polynomially small in z), the following properties hold:
Proof. Consider any z-good interval and let l = z k be the number of insertion and deletion events during this interval. We first show that, with high probability, all swarms are good during the entire z-good interval. Let ξ i be the event that some swarm is bad immediately after the i-th insertion or deletion event. Then we know that:
We now seek to bound P r(ξ i | ∩ i−1 j=1ξ j ) for any i. This is the probability that some swarm becomes bad after the i-th insertion or deletion event given that all swarms were good before this event. If all swarms were good before the i-th insertion or deletion event, then by Lemma 5 all peers that were inserted into the network from the start of the z-good interval until immediately after this i-th event, were inserted at random locations on the unit circle. Assuming that deletions of correct peers are not dependent on the locations of the correct peers on the unit circle, this implies that the correct peers are all distributed uniformly at random on the unit circle immediately after the i-th insertion or deletion event.
Now note that in the worst case, none of the Byzantine peers leave the network during the z-good interval. So we can assume that there are at most (1/4− 0 )z Byzantine peers distributed uniformly at random on the unit circle and at least z total peers distributed uniformly at random on the unit circle. Thus, by Lemma 4, after the i-th insertion or deletion event, all swarms are good with probability 1 − 1/n k for any fixed constant k . Since n ≥ z, this implies that P r(ξ i | ∩ i−1 j=1ξ j ) ≤ 1/z k . Plugging this into the above, we have
Thus for k chosen sufficiently large but depending only on k, this probability can be made arbitrarily small. Provided that all swarms are good for the entire z-good interval, we can enforce a rule-set for all peers in the network. Moreover, Lemma 3 implies that all calls to successor will succeed and will have resource costs given in the theorem statement. The resource costs for the join operation follow immediately from Lemma 5.
A.2 Proofs for Section 2: Linkage Structure Lemma 1. Let p and q be any two peers. Then, the following are true.
Thus q ∈ Backward(p, i). A similar argument shows that if p ∈ Backward(q, i) for some i between 1 and log m − 1, then q ∈ F orward(p, i).
Lemma 2.
With high probability, the number of peers any peer links to is Θ(log 2 n).
Proof. With high probability, when n peers are distributed uniformly at random on the unit circle, the shortest arc length between two peers is Θ(1/n 2 ) [13]. Thus with high probability, the number of actual forward and backward intervals each peer must keep track of is actually only Θ(log n) (i.e. not Θ(log m)). By standard Chernoff bounds, we can show that with high probability, the total number of peers falling in any Center, Forward or Backward interval is Θ(log n). The lemma then follows directly.
A.3 Proofs for Section 3: SUCCESSOR and Swarm Goodness
Lemma 3. For any key k and peer p, SU CCESSOR(k) always returns pointers to all peers in S(k) when called by peer p. Moreover, SU CCESSOR has latency O(log n) and requires O(log 3 n) messages.
Proof. We first show that all peers in our network have the links required to follow the SU CCESSOR protocol. First note that all peers in S(x) must be able to send the request to all peers in S(next(x, k)). In other words, for any i between 1 and log m − 1, all peers in the interval [x, x + (C ln n)/n] must know all peers in the interval [x + 2 i /m, x + 2 i /m + (C ln n)/n]. This requirement is satisfied since each peer tracks Forward intervals and so knows, for all i between 1 and log m − 1, all peers in the interval [p + 2 i /m − (C ln n)/n, p + 2 i /m + (C ln n)/n]. Note also that all peers in the interval [next(x, k), next(x, k)+(C ln n)/n] need to know all peers in the interval [x, x+(C ln n)/n] (so that they can majority filter). This requirement is satisfied since each peer tracks Backwards intervals and so knows, for all i between 1 and log m − 1, all peers in the
Finally, we note that the while loop of this protocol terminates when d(x, k) ≤ (C ln n)/n. At this point, all peers in S(x) are expected to know all peers in S(k). In other words, all peers in the interval [x, x + (C ln n)/n] are expected to know all peers in the interval [k, k + (C ln n)/n] where k ≤ x + (C ln n)/n. Note also that all peers in the interval [k, k + (C ln n)/n] are expected to know all peers in the interval [x, x + (C ln n)/n]. These requirements are satisfied since each peer tracks a Center interval and so knows all peers in the interval [p − (2C ln n)/n, p + (2C ln n)/n]. We now show that SU CCESSOR(k) always returns pointers to all peers in S(k) when called by any peer p. Initially, p sends the request for k to S(p). By Lemma 4, S(p) is good with high probability. Thus, in the first iteration of the while loop, all peers in S(x ) will receive the request for k from a majority of peers in S(p). A simple inductive argument then shows that in any iteration of the while loop, all peers in S(x ) will receive the request for k from a majority of the peers in S. This implies that when d(x, k) ≤ (C ln n)/n, a majority of the peers in S(x) will be good and have the request for k. These peers will then retrieve pointers to all the peers in S(k). The proof that these pointers arrive safely back to the peer p follows from a symmetric argument.
We now show that the latency is O(log n). Note that, by construction of the next function, each iteration of the while loop reduces the distance between x and k by at least a factor of two. The loop terminates when the distance between x and k is no more than (C ln n)/n. In the worst case, this distance initially is 1. Thus, if we let i be the number of iterations, we require that 1/2 i ≤ (C ln n)/n. This requires that i ≥ log n − C log ln n, so the number of iterations and thus the latency is always O(log n). In each iteration of the while loop, all peers in the set S forward the request for k to all peers in the set S(x ). Both S and S(x ) are of size O(log n), so the number of messages sent in each iteration is O(log 2 n). Since there are O(log n) iterations, the total number of messages sent is O(log 3 n)
We now present the lemmas and proofs related to showing swarm-goodness.
Lemma 8. For any positive integer k and positive , for C sufficiently large but depending only on k and , with probability at least 1 − 1/n k the following statement is true. For any interval I of length (C ln n)/n, I contains at least (1 − )C ln n peers.
Proof. Let ξ be the event that some interval of length I contains less than (1 − )C ln n peers. If such an interval exists, there must also be an interval I with the same properties and the additional property that I is open on its counterclockwise end starting at some peer point p. Thus, to bound the probability of ξ, we need only consider the existence of such an interval. Consider a fixed peer p and let I p be an interval which is open on its counterclockwise end starting at some peer point p and which has length (C ln n)/n. Let X p be a random variable giving the number of peers in I p . By linearity of expectation, E(X p ) = ((n − 1)/n)(C ln n), which implies that (1/2)C ln n ≤ E(X p ) ≤ C ln n. Using Chernoff bounds, we can say that for all δ > 0:
. Setting δ = 1 − (n/(n − 1))(1 − ), we get:
Where the last line follows since E(X p ) ≥ (1/2)(C ln n) and for n large, δ 2 ≥ 2 . Now if we do a union bound over all peers p, we get that:
Where the last line follows provided that C is sufficiently large.
Lemma 9. For any fixed integer k and fixed , such that 0 < < 4 0 , for C sufficiently large but depending only on k, and 0 , with probability at least 1 − 1/n k the following statement is true. For any interval I of length (C ln n)/n, I contains no more than 1/4(1 − )C ln n faulty peers.
Proof. Let ξ be the event that there is some interval I with length (C ln n)/n such that the number of faulty peers falling in I is greater than 1/4(1 − )C ln n. If such an interval exists, there must also be an interval I such that I is of length (C ln n)/n, the number of faulty peers falling in I is more than 1/4(1 − )C ln n and the counterclockwise endpoint of I is the peer point for some faulty peer p. Thus, to bound the probability of ξ, we need only consider those intervals whose counterclockwise endpoint is the peer point for some faulty peer. Consider a fixed faulty peer p and the interval I p which starts at p's peer point and has length (C ln n)/n. Let X p be a random variable giving the number of faulty peers falling in I p . By linearity of expectation, we can say that E(X p ) ≤ 1 + (1/4 − 0 )(C ln n) and E(X p ) ≥ (1/4 − 0 )(C ln n). To use Chernoff bounds, we first want to choose a δ such that P r(X p ≥ 1/4(1 − )C ln n) ≤ P r(X p ≥ (1 + δ)E(X p )). This requires that (1 + δ)E(X p ) ≤ 1/4(1 − )C ln n which requires that:
Then since < 4 0 , we know that δ > 0. Hence using Chernoff bounds, we can say that:
Where the second line follows due to Chernoff bounds. Now if we do a union bound over all peers p, we get that :
Where the last line follows provided that C is sufficiently large but dependent only on k, and 0 .
Lemma 4. For any fixed integer k, for C sufficiently large but depending only on k, with probability at least 1 − 1/n k , the following statement is true. For any point x on the unit circle, the swarm S(x) is good.
Proof. Let be fixed such that 0 < < 4 0 and let k be any positive integer, then for C chosen sufficiently large but depending only on and k, with probability 1 − 1/n k , the following statement is true by Lemma 8 and Lemma 9. For any interval I of length (C ln n)/n, the number of peers in I is at least (1 − )C ln n and the number of faulty peers in I is no more than 1/4(1 − )C ln n. But these two facts imply that there is no more than a 1/4 fraction of faulty peers in I. Since a swarm is simply all the peers in an interval of length (C ln n)/n, this implies that for any point x on the unit circle, the swarm S(x) is good.
A.4 Proof for Section 4: JOIN
Proof. The peers of S(q) generate an identifier for peer p using the protocol discussed in Appendix C. This incurs Θ(log n) latency and requires Θ(log 3 n) messages to be sent. The SU CCESSOR protocol is then called O(1) times by S(q) to obtain pointers to all peers in Center(p) and to inform all peers in Center(p) of p's entry into the network; this accounts for the O(log n) latency. Each peer p in S(p) maintains links to all peers in F orward(p, i) = [p + 2 i /m − (C ln n)/n, p + 2 i /m + (C ln n)/n]. Therefore, all peers in S(p) can both obtain pointers to the set S 1 of peers in [p + 2 i /m, p + 2 i /m + (C ln n)/n] as well as directly notify these peers of p's existence using all-to-all communication. Via its Backward interval links, each peer p in S 1 has pointers to the set S 2 of peers in [p + 2 i /m − (C ln n)/n, p + 2 i /m]. In this way, the peers in S 1 can easily obtain the pointers to the peers in S 2 and notify them of p's existence using all-to-all communication.
Therefore, obtaining pointers for F orward(p, i) and alerting the peers of F orward(p, i) of p's existence requires O(1) latency and O(log 2 n) messages. The same argument and complexity analysis applies to method by which p's Backward intervals are obtained and notified of p's existence. This procedure is used for all O(log n) Forward and Backward intervals of p; therefore, the total cost of updating all such intervals is O(log n) latency and O(log 3 n) messages. After step 4 of JOIN , p knows all peers in Center(p). As stated previously, with high probability, the shortest arc length between two peers is Θ(1/n 2 ). Thus with high probability, there are no peers in the interval [p, p + 1/n 3 ]. In other words, the interval F orward(p, i) for i equal to log m − 3 log n contains a superset of all the peers in any interval F orward(p, i) for i < log m − 3 log n. A similar argument holds for the backward intervals of peer p. Thus, after executing the for loop of the join protocol, p will know all peers in its Center, Forward and Backward intervals.
Let q be any peer with the property that p is in a Center, Forward or Backward interval for q. Then by Lemma 1, q must be in a Center, Forward or Backward interval for p. Thus, step 3, step 7, or step 9 of the algorithm will notify q of p's existence.
Assume, before p joins the network, that the fraction of faulty peers is no more than 1/4 − and that all peer points are distributed uniformly at random on the unit circle. Then by Lemma 4, w.h.p., all swarms are good and in particular, S(p ) is good. Thus in step 1 of JOIN , the peer p will be assigned a random ID and so after p joins the network, all peer points will be distributed uniformly at random on the unit circle.
A.5 The ST ABILIZE Protocol
Algorithm 5 gives the pseudocode for the ST ABILIZE algorithm. This algorithm performs similar functionality to the stabilize function in Chord. In particular, ST ABILIZE keeps a peer's pointers up to date in the face of peer failures and changes in the size of the network. Every peer runs ST ABILIZE periodically. When a peer p invokes ST ABILIZE, it first determines whether its estimate of (ln n)/n has changed since the last stabilization procedure. If this estimate has not increased (i.e. the network size has not decreased), then p's Center, Forward and Backward intervals have not increased in size. Links to those peers who belonged, prior to stabilization, in p's Center, Forward or Backward intervals but now lie outside the new, possibly shorter, intervals are deleted. If p's estimate of (ln n)/n has increased (i.e. the network size has decreased), then p must increase the length of its Center, Forward and Backward intervals. It does this by calling SU CCESSOR repeatedly in order to find the peers which fall in these new, larger intervals.
Lemma 10. ST ABILIZE has the following properties with high probability.
• It has latency O(log n) and requires O(log 4 n) messages (this can be reduced to O(log 3 n) messages in expectation by using Algorithm 5);
• After a peer p calls it, p knows all peers in its Center, Forward and Backward intervals.
Proof. Peer p has O(log n) Center, Forwards and Backwards intervals and each of these intervals is of length O((log n)/n). Thus, there are Θ(log n) calls to the SU CCESSOR function in step 3 of ST ABILIZE. Each of these calls has O(log n) latency and requires O(log 3 n) messages (or O(log 2 n) messages in expectation using Algorithm 3 ).
1: if ((ln n)/n has not increased) then
2:
Peer p updates the length of its Center, Forward and Backward intervals (these intervals will be lengthened);
3:
Peer p finds all the new peers in these lengthened intervals by repeatedly calling the SU CCESSOR algorithm; 4: else
5:
Peer p updates the length of its Center, Forward and Backward intervals (these intervals will be shortened or remain the same);
6:
Peer p removes those peers with identifiers that no longer fall into these new intervals; 7: end if
The fact that p knows all peers in its Center, Forward and Backward intervals after calling ST ABILIZE follows directly from Lemma 3.
A.6 Proofs for Section 5: Θ(log 2 n) Expected Messages For SUCCES-SOR Lemma 11. The expected number of messages sent by correct peers in Algorithm 3 is Θ(log n)
Proof. For any peer x ∈ S j−1 , let M x be a random variable giving the number of messages sent by x. Note that E(M x ) = |S j |/ log n. Let M be the sum over all correct peers x of M x . Then by linearity of expectation,
For a message m, for any swarm S to which m is sent by the above protocol, let G(S, m) be the set of correct peers in S that receive m (after majority filtering over the accepted messages).
Lemma 12. For any fixed k and fixed > 0, for C sufficiently large but depending only on and k, the following is true with probability 1/n k . If
Proof. We will show this lemma by showing that there is a set Y ⊆ S j , |Y | ≥ (1− )|S j |, such that for each peer y ∈ Y , more than a 2/3-rd's fraction of the peers that y accepts messages from are peers in G. Since at least 3/4 of the peers in S j are correct, this implies that |G(S j , m)| ≥ (3/4 − )|S j |.
Let B be the set of integers between 0 and log n − 1. We will refer to elements of B as bins and for a peer x ∈ S j−1 and i ∈ B, we will say that x falls in bin i if h 1 (x) = i mod log n. We will say that a bin is bad if the number of peers in G which fall in the bin is no more than a 2/3-fraction of the number of peers in S j−1 that fall in the bin. We first show that, for any fixed > 0, for C sufficiently large, with high probability, no more than an fraction of the bins are bad.
Fix B ⊆ B where |B | = log n. Let N (G, B ) be a random variable giving the number of peers in G that fall in a bin in B . Let N (S j−1 , B ) be a random variable giving the number of peers in S j−1 that fall in a bin in B . For all bins in B to be bad, it must be the case that N (G, B ) ≤ (2/3)N (S j−1 , B ). Note that E(N (G, B )) = C(2/3 + ) log n and E(N (S j−1 , B )) = C log n. A simple application of Chernoff bounds gives that for any fixed δ > 0 and fixed k > 0, for C sufficiently large, with probability at least 1 − 1/n k+2 :
This implies that
where the last line follows provided that δ is sufficiently small. For any B ⊆ B, |B | = log n, let ξ(B ) be the event that all bins in Y are bad. We've shown that for any k > 0, for C sufficiently large, P r(ξ(Y )) ≤ 1/n k+2 . Now let ξ 1 = B ⊆B,|B |= log n ξ(Y ). Then by a simple union bound:
Now say that any peer y ∈ S j is uninformed if it falls in a bad bin. Let U (S j ) be a random variable giving the number of uninformed peers in S j . Let ξ 2 be the event that U (S j ) > |S j |. We will now upperbound P r(ξ 2 |ξ 1 ). Assume that event ξ 1 does not occur. Then E(U (S j )) ≤ |S j |. Moreover, since U (S j ) is the sum of |S j | independent indicator random variables (one for each peer in S j ), we can apply Chernoff bounds. They imply that, for any fixed δ > 0 and fixed k > 0, for C sufficiently large, with probability at least 1 − 1/n k+1 :
Choosing δ and such that (1 + δ) = gives that P r(ξ 2 |ξ 1 ) ≤ 1/n k+1 . Now note that:
where the last line follows for n sufficiently large.
The following lemma gives the robustness of Algorithm 3 over all ordered pairs of swarms.
Lemma 13. For C sufficiently but depending only on k , the following is true with probability at least 1 − 1/n k . For any ordered pair of swarms S j−1 and
Proof. Let S j−1 and S j be fixed, let be 1/24 and k = k +2 in Lemma 12. Then we have that for C sufficiently large, with probability 1/n k +2 , if |G(S j−1 , m)| ≥ (17/24)|S j−1 | then |G(S j , m)| ≥ (17/24)|S j |. The number of ordered pairs of swarms is n 2 . Thus, a union bound establishes the result for any ordered pair with probability 1/n k .
Lemma 6. For C sufficiently large but depending only on k , then the following is true with probability at least 1 − 1/n k :
Proof. Consider some arbitrary call to SUCCESSOR described by the sequence: p, S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , . . . , S l . Here p sends the request r to swarm S 1 = S(p), S 1 sends the request to S 2 via Algorithm 3, S 2 sends the request to S 3 via Algorithm 3 and so on. Since p sends the request r to all peers in S 1 , G(S 1 , r) ≥ (3/4)|S 1 |. Lemma 13 and induction give that G(S l , r) ≥ (17/24)|S l |. Thus (17/24)|S l | peers in S l receive the request r and fetch the appropriate data item, d.
The data item is now sent back along the path S l , S l−1 , S l−2 , . . . , S 1 , p. Again by Lemma 13 and induction we can see that G(S 1 , d) ≥ (17/24)S 1 . This implies that when p does majority filtering on the messages it receives from S 1 , that it will receive the correct message d. Finally, note that since l = O(log n), by Lemma 11, the expected number of messages sent is Θ(log 2 n).
A.7 Proofs for Section 6: Expected Constant Factor Increase in Number of Bits Lemma 14. For any fixed k, for C sufficiently large but depending only on k, the following is true with probability at least 1 − 1/n k . For all swarms S, if |G(S)| ≥ |S|/2 and all peers in S send their pieces to some peer x, then x will be able to reconstruct the message m.
Proof. We first fix a swarm S and calculate the probability that the statement of the lemma is not true. For any set of correct peers, X, let U (X) = {i|h 1 (x) = i mod log n, for some peer x ∈ X}. Let S be some fixed subset of correct peers in S such that |S | ≥ |S|/2 and all peers in S have their pieces. Let P be some fixed subset of the set of log n pieces ({e 0 , e 1 , . . . , e log n−1 }), such that |P | > (15/16) log n. Let ξ(S , P ) be the probability that no peer in X has a piece in P . This is equivalent to a balls and bins problem where there are |S | balls and log n bins and we are asking the probability that none of the |S | balls fall in a fixed set of |P | of the bins. Thus,
Now let ξ(S) be the event that for any subsets S and P , the event ξ(S , P ) occurs. Then we have:
Where the last line follows since |S| ≥ C log n. Now, a simple union bound over all n of the swarms then gives that the probability that the statement in the lemma fails for any swarm is no more than 1/n C−2 . Choosing C sufficiently large makes this probability no more than 1/n k for any k.
We will refer to one iteration of the loop in Algorithm 4 as a round.
Lemma 15. For any fixed k, for C sufficiently large but depending only on k, the following is true with probability 1 − 1/n k for all pairs of swarms, S j−1 and S j . If |G(S j−1 )| ≥ 1/2|S j−1 | before Algorithm 4 starts, then |G(S j−1 )| ≥ 1/2|S j | after termination. Further, if all peers in S j−1 know all of the fingerprints before Algorithm 4 starts, then all peers in S j will know all the fingerprints after termination. Algorithm 4 will:
• Terminate in O(1) rounds in expectation;
• Require correct peers to send O(log 3 n) messages in expectation;
• Require correct peers to send O(|m| + log 4 n) bits to be sent in expectation.
Proof. Since swarm S j−1 is good and the peers in S j do majority filtering in Step 2, we know that if all peers in S j−1 know all of the fingerprints before Algorithm 4 starts, then all peers in S j will know all the fingerprints after termination. If |G(S j−1 )| ≥ 1/2|S j−1 |, then by Lemma 14, all peers in the set P which are sent the message pieces in Step 5 will be able to reconstruct the message m. Since 3/4 of the peers in S j are correct, the probability that no peer in P is correct is no more than (1 − 1/ log n) (3/4)C log n ≤ e −(3/4)C . Thus with constant probability, some peer in the set P is correct. If this is the case, then all peers in S j will receive their correct piece of the message. This implies that the algorithm will terminate in that round with |G(S j )| ≥ 1/2|S j |. This implies that Algorithm 4 will terminate in an expected constant number of rounds.
We next establish correctness. Consider the situation where no peer in P is correct. There are then two possible cases. First is the case less than 1/2|S j | peers in S j are sent their pieces in Step 5. In this case, no peer in Step 2 will receive at least (3/4)|S j | messages saying that pieces were received. Thus all correct peers will set their resend bits to 1 in this step and so the consensus will be to request a resend. This implies that the algorithm will continue for another round. The second case is that faulty peers in P send pieces to at least 1/2|S j | peers in S j . If this is the case, then it's safe for the algorithm to terminate.
We now compute the resource costs. Previous to the first round, the fingerprints are sent which requires O(log 2 n) messages and O(log 4 n) bits. The expected size of the set P is O(1). Thus, in each round of the algorithm, the total number of messages sent is O(log 2 n) and the expected total number of bits sent is O(|m| + log 3 n). The expected resource costs of the entire algorithm then follow directly from the fact that there are O(1) rounds in expectation.
For any swarm S, we will now let G(S) = {x ∈ S|h 1 (x) = i mod log n and x is correct and has piece e i }.
• All calls to SEN D M ESSAGE require O(|m| log n + log 5 n) bits to be sent in expectation.
Proof. Consider a message m which is sent along a path described by the sequence: p, S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , . . . , S l , q. Here peer p sends all pieces of m and fingerprints of these pieces to S 1 = S(p), S 2 sends the pieces and fingerprints to S 2 via Algorithm 4, S 2 sends the pieces and fingerprints to S 3 via Algorithm 4 and so on until finally all peers in swarm S l sends all their pieces and fingerprints to peer q. Since, |G(S 1 )| ≥ 1/2|S 1 |, Lemma 15 and induction give that |G(S l )| ≥ 1/2|S j | and that all peers in S l have all the fingerprints of these pieces. This implies that when peers in S l send their pieces and fingerprints to q, q will have enough information to reconstruct the message m.
B Handling Different Estimates of ln n and (ln n)/n Throughout the previous sections, we have simplified our protocols by assuming that peers know the values ln n and (ln n)/n exactly. We now show how to remove this assumption. In particular, we describe how a peer in the enhanced network successfully obtains estimates of ln n and (ln n)/n and uses these values in the protocols SUCCES-SOR, JOIN, and STABILIZE. Furthermore, we describe how Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 can be modified to work when each peer has an estimate of log n.
B.1 Estimates t p , l p and h p
In our DHT, every peer maintains an estimate t p of ln n, a low estimate l p of (ln n)/n, and a high estimate h p of (ln n)/n. In this section we show how a peer can 1) obtain t p and 2) obtain good low and high estimates of (ln n)/n, l p and h p . Many of the techniques we use in this section are similar to those in [13] .
B.1.1 Obtaining t p
Without Byzantine faults, a good estimate of ln n can be obtained by the methods described in [15, 13, 24] . We demonstrate that this method still provides a good estimate even under our adversarial model. Let nhbr(p) denote the closest clockwise peer to p of which p is aware 5 .
Lemma 16. Let p be a peer in the enhanced DHT and let the fraction of Byzantine peers in the network be f T . Then, with high probability:
Proof. Let p be a peer in the enhanced DHT and let the fraction of Byzantine peers in the network be f T . If p is aware of all Byzantine peers, then by [13] , for sufficiently large n, then we have:
Conversely, if p is aware of none of the Byzantine peers, then:
Taking the smallest lower bound and the largest upper bound, we have that:
In order to achieve an estimate of ln n, each peer p sets t p = ln( d(p,nhbr(p) ).
B.1.2 Obtaining l p and h p
Here we show how a peer p can obtain low and high estimates, l p and h p , of (ln n)/n. Let len(I) denote the length of an interval I on the unit circle. The following lemma is due to King and Saia [13] ; the proof requires some modifications to account for Byzantine behavior and is presented here for completeness.
Lemma 17. Let α 1 , α 2 , be positive constants with α 1 < α 2 and 0 ≤ ≤ 1. Let C be a positive constant depending only on α 1 , α 2 , and k. Then for n sufficiently large, with probability 1 − n −k , the following is true:
• Let I be an interval anchored at some peer p on the circumference of the unit circle.
If the number of correct peers I contains is greater than (Cα 1 ) log n and the number of total peers I contains is less than (Cα 2 ) log n. Then, C(1 − )α 1 (log n/n) ≤ len(I) ≤ C(1 + )α 2 (log n/n).
Proof. Fix some peer point p, where p is a correct peer, on the unit circle. Let I s be the interval starting at p and extending clockwise for a distance of C(1− )α 1 (log n/n). Let I l be the interval starting at p and extending clockwise for a distance of C(1+ )α 2 (log n/n).
We will now show that with high probability, I s contains less than or equal to Cα 1 log n other correct peer points and I l contains greater than or equal to Cα 2 log n other correct peer points 6 . Let X s be a random variable giving the number of correct peer points other than p that fall into the interval I s . Note that a single correct peer point falls in the interval I s with probability C(1 − )α 1 (log n)/n, so by linearity of expectation:
Chernoff [16] bounds tell us that for any δ such that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1:
Setting δ = /(1 − ) ensures that:
Therefore:
where the second line follows if we assume that n ≥ 2 (since then ((1− f T )n − 1)/n ≥ 1/4 since f T ≤ 1/4) and the third line follows from our assumption that 0 ≤ ≤ 1. Now let X l be a random variable giving the number of correct peer points other than p that fall in the interval I l . A single correct peer point falls in the interval X l with probability C(1 + )α 2 (log n/n), so by linearity of expectation:
Chernoff bounds tell us that for any δ, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1:
We want to choose δ such that (1−δ)E(X l ) ≥ Cα 2 log n. Assume that ((1−f T )n−1)/n ≥ γ for some value γ < 1. Then we know that E(X l ) ≥ Cγ(1 + )α 2 log n. Thus to ensure
. In other words, we need δ ≤ 1 − 1 γ(1+ ) . To use Chernoff bounds, we have the additional constraint that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Therefore, it must be the case that
satisfies all of these constraints and requires that δ ≤ 2+ . Setting δ = 2+ (and assuming that n > (1+ ) /2−f T (1− ) ), we have that:
where the second line follows if we assume that n ≥ 2 (since ((1 − f T )n − 1)/n ≥ 1/4) and the third line follows by our assumption that 0 ≤ ≤ 1. Now for the peer p, consider any anchored interval I that has p as its anchor point. Say that I is small if it has length less than or equal to C(1 − )α 1 (log n/n), and large if it has length greater than or equal to C(1 + )α 2 (log n/n). The bad event for p is that either 1) I is small and I contains greater than Cα 2 log n correct peer points other than p. Let ξ p be the bad event for the peer p. Then, by a simple union bound, we can say that:
Now let ξ be the event that for any peer p, there exists an interval I anchored at p such that 1) I is small and I contains greater than Cα 1 log n correct peer points other than p or 2) I is large and I contains less than Cα 2 log n peer points other than p. In other words, ξ is the event that the statement of the lemma fails. Again by a simple union bound, we can say that:
The last equation can be made arbitrarily small for C chosen large enough.
Lemma 18. Let C be a sufficiently large positive constant depending only on k, , and 0 . With probability at least 1 − n −k , every peer p can obtain low and high estimates of (ln n)/n, l p and h p , such that:
• For any two peers p and q, l q ≤ h p and l p ≤ h q .
• Each interval I with len(I) ≥ (C ln n) contains no more than 1/4(1− )C ln n faulty peers.
Proof. From Lemma 17, p can obtain an estimate est p of (ln n)/n such that (C 1 ln n)/n ≤ est p ≤ (C 2 ln n)/n for constants 1 ≤ C 1 ≤ C 2 . Let C be a positive constant as in Lemma 4 (depending on k, , and 0 ) so that an interval I with len(I) = (C ln n)/n is of sufficient length to guarantee, whp, that no more than 1/4(1 − )C ln n of the peers contained within are faulty. Now p can set l p = C/C 1 est p and h p = CC 2 /C 1 est p which satisfies the claims.
B.2 Links Required
In this section, we reaffirm certain invariants about the links each peer maintains in our protocol. We redefine the swarm intervals as:
• F orward(p, i) = [p +
• Center(p) = [p − 2h p , p + 2h p ] for any peer p.
Lemma 19. Let x be a point on the unit circle. Then, with probability at least 1 − n −k , S(x) contains no more than an 1/4(1 − )-fraction of faulty peers; that is, S(x) is good.
Proof. This follows from the new definition of a swarm and an almost identical argument to what is provided by Lemma 8, Lemma 9, and Lemma 4.
Lemma 20. This is the analog to Lemma 1. Let p and q be any two correct peers. Then, the following are true:
• p maintains links to all peers in the interval [p − 2C ln n/n, p + 2C ln n/n]
-q maintains a link to p and vice versa.
• If p is in the interval [q − 2 i /m − C ln n/n, q − 2 i /m + C ln n/n] for some fixed i where 1 ≤ i ≤ log m − 1, then:
Proof. Note that (C ln n)/n ≤ l p ≤ h p and the same for l q and h q . Therefore, this follows directly from the new definitions of Center, Forward, and Backward intervals of p and q.
Lemma 21. With high probability, the number of peers any peer links to is Θ(log 2 n)
Proof. This proof is virtually identical to Lemma 2.
B.3 Successor Protocol
The pseudocode for SUCCESSOR using estimates of l p and h p is given in Algorithm 6. A crucial point about SUCCESSOR, as well as JOIN and STABILIZE, is that not all correct peers in a swarm may choose to partake in the protocol due to differing estimates of (ln n)/n. However, we can always guarantee, with high probability, that all correct peers in some sub-interval of the swarm, of length greater than or equal to (C ln n)/n, are acting as the protocol directs. This guarantee is what allows our protocols to function successfully.
If peer p desires the content associated with key k, it uses its high estimate to alert those peers in [p, p + h p ] of its request. Each peer q receiving the alert decides whether it belongs to S(p) by determining whether p lies in a counterclockwise interval of length l q from q. If so, q forwards the request as originally described to the interval [x − h p , x + h p ] where x = next(p, k). A peer q along the path traversed by SUCCESSOR only forwards the request once it has received it from a majority of peers in one of its backward intervals now defined using l p . A peer q who receives the same request from a majority of peers in one of its backward intervals, forwards the request to the interval defined by x = next(x, k) using h q ; that is, the interval [x , x + h q ]. The SUCCESSOR operation ends once d(x, k) ≤ l p at which point the set of all identifiers to all peers in S(k) are sent back to p along the search path.
Algorithm 6 SUCCESSOR(k)
1: p sends a request for k to all peers in [p, p + h p ]; 2: S ← set of all peers in [p, p + h p ]; 3: x ← identifier of p; 4: Every peer q which received the request for k from a majority of peers in [x, x + l q ] do the following:
q sends back all identifiers in S(k) to all peers that sent q the request (these identifiers are recursively sent back along the same path to p). 7: else 8:
x ← next(x, k); Proof. Here we show that all peers in the network possess the links required to carry out the SUCCESSOR protocol; in Lemma 23, we will show correctness.
The initial step in the protocol requires p be able to alert its swarm S(p) to p's request. This requirement is satisfied because p maintains links to all peers in Center(p) = [p − 2h p , p + 2h p ] and so p maintains links to all peers in [p, p + h p ]. Each peer q in the interval [p, p + h p ] must then be able to decide whether it belongs to S(p). Since q also maintains links to all peers in Center(q), q can determine whether or not p lies in the interval [q − q l , q]. If so, q agrees that it belongs to S(p) and forwards the request; otherwise, q ignores the request.
By the protocol, every peer q in S(x) must be able to send the request to all peers in S(next(x, k)) = [next(x, k), next(x, k) + h q ]. In other words, for any i between 1 and log m − 1, all peers in [x, x + h q ] must maintain links to the set F of all peers in [x + 2 i /m, x + 2 i /m + h q ]. However, each peer q maintains Forward intervals and, therefore, knows the set F of peers in [q + 2 i /m − h q , q + 2 i + h q ]. Since F ⊆ F , all necessary forward links exist for q.
For the purposes of majority filtering on incoming requests, each peer q in the interval [next(x, k), next(x, k) + h q ] needs to know the set B of all peers in the interval [x, x+ (C ln n)/n]. However, each peer q tracks Backward intervals and, therefore, knows the set B of peers in [x − 2 i /m − l q , x − 2 i /m + l q ]. Since B ⊆ B , all peers have the required backward links. l p has decreased in value, then p infers that the network has decreased in size. Then, the Forward, Backward, and Center intervals of p need to be expanded via calls to SU CCESSOR. If l p is unchanged or has increased in value, then p infers that the network has grown. In this case, ST ABILIZE is less costly since the Forward, Backward, and Center intervals of p need to shrink. This is accomplished by simply removing links to those peers that no longer belong to these updated intervals.
Algorithm 8 STABILIZE(p)
1: if (p's estimate of l p has not increased) then
2:
Peer p updates the length of its Center, Forward and Backward intervals {these intervals will be lengthened};
3:
5:
6:
Peer p removes those peers with identifiers that no longer fall into these new intervals; 7: end if Lemma 25. ST ABILIZE has the following properties with high probability.
Proof. This is virtually identical to the proof given for Lemma 10.
B.6 Obtaining an Additive Factor Approximation to log n Previous work [13] shows how, with high probability, each peer in a DHT can estimate log n to within an arbitrarily close constant factor. We now reaffirm this result for our DHT.
Lemma 26. Let C 0 be a positive constant. In our enhanced DHT, with high probability, any peer, p, can obtain an estimate u p of log n such that:
log n ≤ u p ≤ log n + C 0
Proof. By Lemma 16, p can obtain a value t p such that:
(1/2) ln n − 0.144 ≤ t p ≤ 3 ln n.
By Lemma 17, p can use this value t p , to obtain an estimate est p of (ln n)/n such that for constants 1 ≤ C 1 ≤ C 2 :
(C 1 ln n)/n ≤ est p ≤ (C 2 ln n/n).
The following is then true: log n − C 1 ≤ log tp estp ≤ log n + C 2 Thus log n ≤ log t p est p + C 1 ≤ log n + C 1 + C 2 .
B.7 Different Estimates of log n for Algorithm 3
We now discuss how to modify the algorithm to handle different estimates of log n. By Lemma 26, for any two peers p and p :
log n ≤ l p ≤ u p ≤ log n + C 0 .
We then change the first two bullets of our algorithm as follows:
• Each peer x ∈ S j−1 sends a message to peer y ∈ S j iff h 1 (x) = h 1 (y) mod l x
• Each peer y ∈ S j accepts a message from peer x ∈ S j−1 iff h 1 (x) = h 1 (y) mod u y Showing the modified algorithm is correct requires only minor modifications of the proof of Lemma 12. Let B again be the set of bins from 0 to log n−1. It is straightforward to show that, with high probability, an arbitrarily small fraction of the bins in B are "bad". Then, with high probability, an arbitrarily large fraction of the peers in S j fall in bins in B which are good. We finally note that the algorithm is robust to minor inconsistencies in the views the peers have as to which peers are in the swarms S j−1 and S j .
B.8 Different Estimates of log n for Algorithm 4
We now discuss how to modify the Algorithm 4 to handle different estimates of log n. As before, we will assume that each peer p has an estimate with the following property for fixed constant C 0 . log n ≤ l p ≤ log n + C 0 .
The algorithm is then modified as follows. The peer p which starts sending the message m encodes m into l p pieces and creates fingerprints for all of these pieces. When it sends the fingerprints to the swarm S 1 , it also sends the number l p to all peers in S 1 . The peers in S 1 then use this number l p as their estimate of log n. When the peers in S 1 send the fingerprints to peers in S 2 , all peers in S 1 also send the number l p to all peers in S 2 . In this way, we maintain the invariant that all peers in the swarms m is sent to know and use the estimate, l p , calculated by p.
We finally note that this algorithm is robust to minor inconsistencies in the views the peers have as to which peers are in the swarms S j−1 and S j .
C Assigning Random Identifiers
In this section, we describe how all correct peers in a good swarm can come to consensus on a random number in (0, 1]. Our algorithm for doing this makes use of results in the area of secure multiparty computation for asynchronous networks which we now describe.
A secure multiparty computation protocol allows a set of s players, t of which are adversarially controlled, to compute the value of an agreed upon multi-variate function F, while keeping their local inputs private (see e.g. [6] ). In the case of an asynchronous network, the inputs to the computation come from an arbitrary core subset C of the set of players where |C| ≥ s − t; for the purpose of computing the function, the inputs of all players not in C are assumed to be some default value (say 0). There are several results showing how to achieve secure multiparty computation in an asynchronous network provided that t ≤ s/4 (see e.g. [2, 21, 18] ).
Using these results, it is straightforward to see how all peers in a good swarm can come to consensus on a random number in (0, 1] . Each peer first chooses as input a random number in (0, 1] . The peers then use the secure computation algorithm to compute the sum, σ, of the inputs from the set C. Each peer then accepts σ mod 1 as the random number chosen. Since at least one player in C must be a correct peer, σ mod 1 must be a random number in (0, 1] . Srinathan and Rangan [21] give the most resource efficient secure multiparty computation protocol of which we are aware for this problem. In the case where there are Θ(log n) peers, no more than 1/4 of which are faulty, we can compute a random number using Θ(log 3 n) messages, with Θ(log n) latency using their protocol.
